

January 9, 1963

Mr. John F. Kennedy  
President of the United States of America  
White House  
Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In 1958, while I was on the faculty of Saint Joseph college, West Hartford, Connecticut, I had some correspondence concerning U.S. aid to communist-dominated countries with you. Today I would like to suggest a course of action regarding Cuba.

The removal of "offensive weapons", real or alleged, has not solved the key problem that is the presence of a communist régime in the Western Hemisphere. As long as Cuba is ruled by the communists, offensive weapons may be reintroduced there in several ways (in air-planes, ships or submarines) or may be hidden there in caves or on underground sites even now.

Furthermore, the political threat (subversion, training of communist agents, organizing terroristic activities from the Cuban sanctuary as well as printing propaganda material and launching political campaigns with the aim of establishing communist régimes in other Latin American countries) is at least as important as the military threat represented by Communist military personnel -- Cuban and non-Cuban -- and weapons of both conventional and non-conventional nature.

The only solution of the problem is to change the government and to reintroduce freedom and democracy in Cuba. In view of the fact that a totalitarian régime can be replaced by a free government only through the use of force, free election or similar method of peaceful change cannot be considered in this particular case at the present time.

The question to be answered is: What kind of force should be employed and in what manner the desired change should be brought about?

It seems to me that among several possible courses of action the following would be the best:

1. The United States government should make a secret agreement with a few governments of central American countries according to which the latter would assume the responsibility (under U.S. guidance) for training of a Cuban refugee invasion force. The U.S. government

would give financial, military and other aid needed to the governments in question.

2. Armed forces of these Central American countries should be equipped with the most modern (non-nuclear) weapons and should be used as a reserve force, or a part of the invasion force, in the invasion of Cuba.

3. Members of the Organization of American States should be won over to support a strong action in Cuba in order to dispose of the real issue -- Communism. A failure to win the support of a few member-states for the proposed policy should not be the cause of giving it up.

4. At an appropriate time, preferably this year (1963), landing of Cuban and other Latin American troops at several places on the island should take place. After bombing of some especially selected targets (air and missile bases), some units should be parachuted in the vicinity of some strategic points in order to capture them in a surprise move. Simultaneously, a call for a general strike and an uprising against the communist régime in Cuba should be made in an all-out propaganda campaign consisting of radio broadcasts and dropping of millions of leaflets all-over the island.

5. In order to prevent Soviet intervention (which is highly unlikely in view of the geographical location of Cuba that makes it technically impossible for the Soviet Union to send substantial aid immediately) the U.S. naval and air force units should be dispatched to the Caribbean area, while the U.S. government would warn the Soviets that their intervention would not be tolerated.

The merits of this course of action:

1. Officially, the United States would not be involved.

2. The enemy would be taken by a surprise. (The surprise element was not exploited in the actions of April 1961, and October 1962.

3. The Latins themselves would take the responsibility for the campaign.

4. The use of "proxies" would put the U.S. government into an excellent negotiating position. In the U.N. it would be defending the right on self-defense of the small Latin American countries.

5. The U.S. contribution to the liberation of Cuba would prove this country's solidarity with the peoples of Latin America; and, at the same time, it would be in the best national interest.

6. The presence of the U.S. troops in the Caribbean would prevent any attempt at a Soviet intervention, and these could be

into action in the event that something would go wrong, that is, if an unexpected development would prevent the invading force to cope with the task of occupying all strategic places in Cuba within a few days. This country cannot afford another defeat similar to that of April, 1961.

7. The success of this action would represent a real victory in the cold war and would bolster the American prestige in this Hemisphere and throughout the world. The "non-aligned" countries, which have the tendency to "ally" themselves with those who appear to be "stronger", would move closer to the West.

I would like to point out that introduction of Soviet-block weapons, including missiles and atomic warheads, was foreseen in my article on "Communist Strategy in Latin America", first published in the YALE REVIEW, Autumn 1960. (It was reprinted in foreign publications of the U.S. Information Agency, and reproduced for class-room use by the Air Force University, Maxwell Base, Alabama; it was inserted in Congressional Record, June 14, 1961.) The article contained my suggestions for the solution of the Cuban problem, and called for an OAS-backed action.

As far back as in October, 1954, on behalf of the Czech Christian Democratic Movement, I submitted to the Administration and the Congress of the United States a memorandum suggesting a new, more realistic conduct of the cold war, and a workable and effective policy with respect to central East Europe. The memorandum was placed in Congressional Record on February 2, 1955, and February 15, 1955. Had the previous administration followed the proposed course of action, it would not have been taken by a surprise when the Hungarian revolution occurred, and the communist problem would have been solved already in 1956.

The failure to eject the communist régime from Cuba may become a fatal mistake: the island, in addition of being a communist springboard for fomenting political and subversive actions in this Hemisphere, may be used as a military base not only against central and South American states, but also against this country.

Sincerely yours,

Josef Kalvoda